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It is suggested that if Cultural-Historical Activity 
Theory (CHAT) is to fulfil its potential as an ap-
proach to cultural and historical science in general, 
then an interdisciplinary concept of activity is 
needed. Such a concept of activity would provide a 
common foundation for all the human sciences, un-
derpinning concepts of, for example, state and so-
cial movement equally as, for example, learning and 
personality. For this is needed a clear conception of 
the ‘unit of analysis’ of activity, i.e., of what consti-
tutes ‘an activity’, and a clear distinction between 
the unit of analysis and the substance, i.e., ultimate 
reality underlying all the human sciences: artifact-
mediated joint activity. 
It is claimed that the concept of ‘project collabora-
tion’ – the interaction between two or more persons 
in pursuit of a common objective – forms such a 
unit of activity, the single ‘molecule’ in terms of 
which both sociological and psychological phenom-
ena can be theorised. It is suggested that such a 
clarification of the notion of activity allows us to 
see how individual actions and societal activities 
mutually constitute one another and are each con-
strued in the light of the other. 
Introduction 
Vasily Davydov was right when he said 
that activity is an ‘interdisciplinary’ concept: 
I always argue that the problem of activity 
and the concept of activity are interdisciplinary 
by nature. There should be specified 
philosophical, sociological, culturological, 
psychological and physiological aspects here. 
That is why the issue of activity is not 
necessarily connected with psychology as a 
profession. It is connected at present because in 
the course of our history activity turned out to be 
the thing on which our prominent psychologists 
focused their attention as early as in the Soviet 
Union days. Things just turned out this way 
(Davydov, 1999: 50, emphasis added). 
The objective of this paper is to take up 
Davydov’s observation and investigate what is 
needed for one and the same concept of activity 
to be useful both in the resolution of problems 
associated with individuals and their relations, 
and those associated with societal entities and 
their relations. Such a concept would provide a 
rational basis for psychology (including educa-
tion, organizational theory, and so on) to ap-
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propriate concepts from sciences concerned 
with societal phenomena (economics, cultural 
studies, political science, and so on) and vice 
versa, and contribute to overcoming the indi-
vidual/society dichotomy. Interdisciplinary 
work is commonly organized through the coop-
eration of different specialists who each use 
specialist theories and concepts, but communi-
cate with one another in the lingua franca. But 
Davydov is right in suggesting that ‘activity’ 
can provide a common theoretical foundation 
across disciplinary boundaries. What is pro-
posed is not a theory of everything, but rather 
concepts which facilitate disciplines critically 
appropriating insights from other disciplines.  
And surely, when Marx spoke about ac-
tivity (Tätigkeit) in “Theses on Feuerbach” 
(1975a) he meant precisely an interdisciplinary 
concept of activity, and not a concept limited to 
the solution of problems of individuals and 
small groups. In fact defining practice as the 
coincidence of changing circumstances and ac-
tivity, he says that “All mysteries which lead 
theory to mysticism find their rational solution 
in human practice and in the comprehension of 
this practice.” All mysteries, not just psycho-
logical mysteries. In the oft-quoted early pages 
of “The German Ideology,” (1975b) he went so 
far as to claim that the ‘real premises’ for his 
work would be ‘the real individuals, their activ-
ity and the material conditions under which 
they live, both those which they find already 
existing and those produced by their activity’ 
(1975b: 31). So defined, this project remains 
before us to this day. 
Because of the ‘historical accident’ re-
ferred to by Davydov, the concept of ‘activity’ 
‘stayed out of politics’ (Sawchuk & Stetsenko 
2008), so to speak, and came to be linked spe-
cifically to psychology. Despite the efforts of 
Activity Theorists, the concept as it has been 
developed is inadequate beyond the domain of 
what Hegel referred to as ‘subjective spirit’ – 
self-contained activity amongst a finite group of 
individuals. Such a science is inadequate for 
grasping the connection with societal phenom-
ena, because Activity Theory has had to un-
critically borrow its conceptions of societal 
entities from other sciences; but it is these enti-
ties which constitute the content of the psyche 
in modern societies. According to Activity 
Theory, an activity is a system of actions in 
pursuit of some object. But in reality, the iden-
tity of such activities have been borrowed from 
other sciences, and fitted into activity theory by 
means of arbitrarily defining suitable ‘objects’. 
For example, a spinner is participating in the 
activity whose object is yarn, although the 
worker’s goal is wages, and the employers’ 
goal is profit. (Leontyev 2009)  
In what follows we will review the gen-
eral conception of activity, drawing upon the 
classic work of Leontyev, leading into consid-
eration of how activity is conceived of as the 
substance of the human sciences. We will con-
trast this conception of activity as substance 
with the conception of a ‘unit of analysis’. How 
these ideas are dealt with by three Russian writ-
ers whose work is canonical and frequently 
cited in the current literature will be considered, 
and reviewed briefly in relation to two prob-
lems of the social sciences: Marx’s critique of 
political economy and the constitution of social 
subjects. We will then consider whether 
Engeström’s response to the problems which 
have been identified, and the work of Michael 
Cole in bringing out the importance of context. 
We will then propose a conception of the ‘unit 
of analysis’ of activity which provides a foun-
dation for both the human sciences and ethics. 
The method of argument used here is im-
manent critique, the method, originated by Ar-
istotle, developed by Hegel (1977) in his 
Phenomenology, and applied by Marx in his 
critique of political economy and by Vygotsky 
(1997) in his study of the Crisis in Psychology. 
Instead of standing outside of a theory and 
pointing out its failings relative to this outside 
position, immanent critique enters into the cur-
rent of thinking itself, and follows the concept’s 
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own development. In making sense of the his-
tory of a concept, the critic is led to an objec-
tive conception of its crisis. This entails a line 
of argument marked by contradictions, rather 
than a series of smooth logical deductions – that 
is the whole point: to bring out the contradic-
tions, and show how they are resolved in actu-
ality. For this approach, science is not the 
function of an individual, but is a social proc-
ess, advancing through crisis and contradiction.  
The General Conception of 
“Activity”  
The idea of ‘Activity Theory’ is associ-
ated with the name of Aleksei Nikolaevich Le-
ontyev (1904-1979, here “Leontyev”), so let us 
begin with his definition of activity. 
Leontyev defines activity through the re-
lation between subject and object. For Leon-
tyev, the subject is any living thing, inclusive of 
whatever form of sensation and consciousness 
that the organism has. The object is something 
in the subject’s environment which represents 
to the organism the satisfaction of a need. Ac-
tivity is what mediates between subject and ob-
ject. 
This approach has the advantage of al-
lowing the origins of consciousness to be traced 
from non-human organic matter. Human life is 
distinguished by the fact that the objects of ac-
tivity and the needs which the objects satisfy 
them are no longer natural objects and biologi-
cal drives, but rather artifacts and needs which 
are themselves products of human activity. 
Human life is thus conceived as a system of 
needs and the means of their satisfaction. 
According to Leontyev, activity is the 
processes by which a person’s actual life in the 
objective world is realized – what they are do-
ing (Tätigkeit), as opposed to the nervous, 
physiological processes that realize this activity 
within the organism, including mental proc-
esses (Leontyev, 2009). The subject-activity-
object relationship exists wherever a living 
thing, as ‘subject’, has a need which lies outside 
of itself, satisfaction of which is the object of 
the subject’s activity, activity which is stimu-
lated by the object. 
The categories of subject, object and ac-
tivity are mutually constitutive. Leontyev’s 
concept of subject is like Kant’s in being asso-
ciated with an individual organism, but differs 
from Kant’s, in that it embraces all living or-
ganisms, not just human beings. Because hu-
man needs are products of social life and are 
invariably satisfied by the products of social 
life, the object is always an artifact. In this 
sense then, activity is always mediated by arti-
facts, but ‘artifact’ is here understood in terms 
of the object of activity. 
Alexander Meshcheryakov explains how 
a child born deaf-blind first comes to experi-
ence a human need: 
Any deaf-blind child has a number of 
basic natural wants (to eat, excrete and protect 
himself). Initially these wants do not in 
themselves constitute true needs in the 
psychological sense of that word. They do not 
exist as human needs in the strict sense, they 
cannot as yet provide the motive force behind 
purposeful behavior, and for this reason no 
human behavior is to be observed in the early 
stages. These wants become true needs only after 
they start to be objectivized and satisfied through 
human methods involving tools and implements 
(Meshcheryakov 2009). 
Possibly the first human activity the child 
born deaf-blind may learn is eating with a 
spoon. The spoon is the bearer of the whole his-
tory of humanity which lies behind the produc-
tion of the spoon, adapted for use in a certain 
way and no other. The deaf-blind child comes 
to need a spoon, and using a spoon may be their 
first human act, and the first element of human 
consciousness. 
Leontyev is at pains to point out that: 
The expression ‘objectless activity’ is 
devoid of any meaning. Activity may seem 
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objectless, but scientific investigation of activity 
necessarily requires discovering its object 
(Leontyev, 1978). 
and continues: 
Thus, the object of activity is twofold: 
first, in its independent existence as 
subordinating to itself and transforming the 
activity of the subject; second, as an image of the 
object, as a product of its property of 
psychological reflection that is realized as an 
activity of the subject and cannot exist otherwise 
(Leontyev, 1978). 
As a special case of the more general 
category of natural, object-oriented activity, 
human activity is adapted to and reflects the 
objective properties and connections of its ob-
jects, but these are themselves human products. 
The foundation of psychology is the capacity of 
the human organism to reflect the properties of 
the objects of its activity.  
So it is human needs which form the 
structure of activity for Leontyev. Remember 
that by human needs we do not mean the bio-
logical drives which underlie the activity of 
lower animals, but rather the human needs and 
the artifacts in which they are objectified, the 
objects which are themselves products of social 
activity. 
Human activity is further characterized by 
the fact that it is social activity meeting social, 
or collective needs; the needs of individuals are 
met only thanks to the meeting of social needs. 
As a result of division of labor, we have a sepa-
ration between the goals of an individual’s ac-
tion and the objective motive of the activity, 
which is deemed to be the meeting of some 
human (i.e., social) need.  
The motive of an activity (such as pro-
duction of yarn) is not translated directly into 
individuals’ goals (such as earning a wage). 
The problem of forming individuals’ goals so 
that the individuals’ actions are rearticulated to 
constitute activities which meet social needs is 
a problem of the social organization of labor. 
The goal of the individual’s action arises only 
thanks to the representation of the activity 
through the mediation of social relations.  
This is Leontyev’s general conception of 
object-oriented activity. Not limited even to 
human life, activity is ubiquitous. Activity is 
neither the object nor a method of research, but 
rather is a general conception of the nature of 
the underlying reality, what is called the ‘prem-
ises’ of a science, or its ‘substance’.  
The Substances, or Premises of a 
Science 
If we are to gain a clear idea of the prob-
lem of ‘unit of analysis’ then it is important to 
clarify the different notion of ‘substance’. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains 
‘substance’ as follows: 
the substances in a given philosophical 
system are those things which, according to that 
system, are the foundational or fundamental 
entities of reality (Robinson, 2004). 
Thus, the substances, or ‘premises’ of a 
science are the conception the researcher has of 
the ultimate reality underlying the universe of 
phenomena with which the science is con-
cerned. The same notion of the substance will 
underlie a whole number of distinct enquiries 
and sciences, within the broad scope of a world 
view. For example, naïve realism presumes the 
existence of matter existing independently of 
human activity, and obedient to natural laws 
which are to be investigated. It is not a question 
of whether this ‘belief’ is true or well-founded 
(undoubtedly it is), but simply that the whole 
idea of natural science is to describe the world 
of Nature, beyond all labor processes. This 
meaning of the word ‘substance’ has flowed 
over into the natural language. For Kantian 
skepticism, science deals with a subjective do-
main of appearances, manifesting things-in-
themselves which are beyond perception; so the 
objects of possible experience are the sub-
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stance, while ‘matter’ and ‘things-in-
themselves’ are deemed not to be legitimate 
objects for science. For Hegel, the premises 
were Spirit (Geist), which he described as “the 
nature of human beings en masse,” (Hegel 1952 
§264) but which he conceived of as pure 
thought; for Hegel even Nature was a manifes-
tation of Spirit. But no writer in the CHAT tra-
dition has broached the issue of substance. 
Outside the domain of psychology and small 
group interactions, CHAT theorists generally 
are generally naïve realists in respect to forma-
tions outside the domain under study. Such an 
approach does not give a means of critically 
appropriating from other disciplines. 
Marx however was clear. For Marx, the 
‘real premises’ were “the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under 
which they live” (1975b: 31). ‘Activity’ is to be 
taken as an interdisciplinary concept, because 
for Marxists it is part of the premises for all 
science, including even the natural sciences. 
The way in which activity functions for natural 
science became clear with the advent of quan-
tum physics and relativity, in which the relevant 
entities cannot be described independently of 
the human activities through which they are 
made objects of experience. For the natural sci-
entist, the wave-particle nonetheless remains 
matter in the philosophical sense of the word. 
Natural scientists can accommodate recourse to 
the language of activity as a method of descrip-
tion of Nature, while maintaining matter as the 
substance. But for the human sciences, activity 
is crucial, for the objects of human life are both 
constituted and perceived by activity, and this is 
the key aspect of activity which an interdisci-
plinary concept of activity must address. Notice 
also that for Marx, activity was not the sole 
substance, for there can be no activity without 
individual human beings and a material world 
which includes the material products of human 
labor. 
To be clear, we cannot talk of a ‘science 
of activity’ since this would amount to a sci-
ence of everything, like a ‘science of matter’. In 
investigating the basis for an ‘interdisciplinary’ 
concept of activity, the aim is (1) to construct a 
richer definition of activity as a premise for 
both psychological and sociological sciences, 
and (2) focus on those problems lying on the 
boundary between psychology and sociology. 
To define this relation a little more precisely, 
we should note that psychology takes as given 
the forms of social practice and the artifacts 
constituted by the culture within which an indi-
vidual psyche develops. On the other hand, the 
sociological sciences effectively take as given 
individual psyches which are adapted to and 
reproduce the culture in which they are active. 
But the viability of these acts of abstraction has 
its limits, just as the viability of natural sci-
ence’s abstraction of natural entities from activ-
ity has its limits. We need a conception of 
activity which is equally adapted to the problem 
of the constitution of forms of practice as to the 
problem of the constitution of the psyche. Le-
ontyev’s general description described above 
fails to provide such a conception. 
In summary, if we are to formulate an in-
terdisciplinary concept of activity, then follow-
ing Marx, we must: 
(1) take the individuals and the material 
conditions, i.e., the constellation of mate-
rial artifacts, along with activity, as our 
premises.  
(2) form a clear conception of the essen-
tial problem of the mutual constitution of 
social life and individual consciousness.  
Central to both problems is the concep-
tion of what constitutes ‘an activity’, that is, of 
what constitutes a unit of social life, from the 
standpoint of Activity Theory. The objects of 
social life are institutions, cultures, discourses, 
norms, and so on. Activity Theory suggests that 
these objects are constituted by activity, but 
what, from the standpoint of activity theory is 
the basic unit, the ‘unit of analysis’, from which 
we can elaborate the constitution of the objects 
of social science through activity? 
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The “unit of analysis”  
Central to formulating the foundations of 
any science is the idea of ‘unit of analysis’, as it 
is called in the CHAT tradition, following Vy-
gotsky. This is the requirement to form a con-
cept of the class of problems to be investigated. 
It is what Marx meant in Preface to first edition 
of Capital, when, following Goethe (1996), he 
referred to the commodity relation as the ‘cell’: 
But in bourgeois society, the commodity-
form of the product of labor – or value-form of 
the commodity – is the economic cell-form 
(Marx 1996). 
Note that Marx derived the whole range 
of phenomena of bourgeois society from the 
commodity relation, despite the fact that ex-
change of commodities is a relatively rare oc-
currence in developed capitalism (Ilyenkov 
1960): invariably commodities are purchased 
and sold for money. Marx derived money as a 
special limiting case of commodity; but if in-
stead, he had begun with money, then he would 
have been quite unable to disclose the ‘mys-
tery’ of capital, because, by starting with such a 
developed conception as ‘money’, he would 
have skipped over the very processes of differ-
entiation and development which make the rela-
tions of capital comprehensible. Exchange of 
commodities is the most primitive relation 
which, when further developed, unfolds into 
purchase and sale, contract, the market, the ac-
cumulation of capital, wage-labor, interest and 
so on and so forth. 
It is the same idea as what Hegel called 
the Notion or conception of a thing, as he ex-
plained in relation to the foundations of the sci-
ence of right, for example: 
The science of right ... must develop the 
idea, which is the reason of an object, out of the 
conception. It is the same thing to say that it 
must regard the peculiar internal development of 
the thing itself (Hegel 1952, §2). 
In the “Philosophy of Right,” Hegel dealt 
not just with right, but with the entire range of 
problems which arise with the creation of a 
modern nation-state, on the basis that all the 
social and political phenomena of the modern 
nation state grow out of the notion of private 
property, which he calls ‘abstract right’ – the 
cell or unit of analysis for what Hegel called 
‘objective spirit’. That is, while spirit remained 
the substance for Hegel, for an analysis of 
modern society, the unit of analysis, according 
to Hegel, was a right, at root, simply private 
property. In the same way, the Logic is made up 
of three sciences: Ontology, the science of Be-
ing, Essence, the science of Reflection and the 
science of the Concept; the Philosophy of Na-
ture is the science of Space. Thus Hegel’s En-
cyclopaedia was a ‘circle of circles’. 
Marx and Hegel spent considerable labor 
to identify, not the most typical or even the 
simplest unit of the complex they were study-
ing, but the most primitive or archetypal rela-
tion, the relation which, once it comes into 
being, through its own process of development, 
sets in train the series of transformations which 
produces the whole complex. Exchange of 
commodities or the recognition of private prop-
erty are each a kind of ‘virus’ which, once es-
tablished, spreads and replicates itself and 
transforms the whole organism. 
The definition of a ‘unit of analysis’ al-
lows a science to be elaborated rationally (as 
opposed to empirically), and sheds light on the 
class of problems which prompted it. The type 
of problems opened up by an interdisciplinary 
conception of activity are analogous to what 
Gadamer (2005) called the ‘hermeneutic cir-
cle’: each word in a text is interpreted in the 
light of it being part of a text of certain genre; 
but conversely, the text is deemed of that genre 
only through the meaning given to each of the 
constituent words. Likewise, the meaning of 
each individual action is derived from an un-
derstanding of the whole activity of which it is 
a part, but conversely, social phenomena are 
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constituted only in and through the meaning 
given to individual actions. In general, indi-
viduals uncritically accept for they appear to be, 
all the states, social classes, institutions and so 
on, they meet with; psychology tends to follow 
individuals in this uncritical acceptance of the 
ontology of social life. Meanwhile conversely, 
the social sciences tend to accept human nature 
as it is, rather than seeing that individual con-
sciousness is constituted by the forms of activ-
ity of which individuals are a part.  
As we have seen from Leontyev’s general 
conception of activity, any social entity which 
performs some social function may be counted 
as ‘an activity’ for the purpose of psychology. 
But while a state, for example, is indeed consti-
tuted by activity, is ‘activity’ a fruitful way of 
approaching the science of the state? That is, 
does the idea of the state as a system of activity 
meeting some specific social need (security 
maybe?) provide a sounds basis for a science of 
the state? Can we simply replace the various 
social formations which need to be understood 
in their own terms, with a ‘needs’ so that it can 
be ‘an activity’? 
An interdisciplinary theory of activity 
will surely be in its element in dealing with 
those problems where the aspect of the consti-
tution of a social phenomenon or entity by the 
actions of individuals has a nearly equal weight 
with the aspect of the actions of individuals be-
ing determined by the relevant social formation 
of which they are a part. That is, problems 
where the interdependence of individual actions 
(psychology) and forms of social practice is 
most prominent. Such problems span psychol-
ogy and sociology, and it is on such problems 
that an interdisciplinary concept of activity 
ought to be able to shed some light.  
An interdisciplinary science of activity 
requires a definite conception of “an activity,” 
that is to say, a unit of analysis which repre-
sents just one unit of the totality of social life. 
How can we analyze activity as the social life 
of human beings? What is a ‘unit’ of social 
life? And what are the types of activity and ac-
cording to what criteria do we differentiate 
them? Unless we can determine the units and 
types of activity from the definition we make of 
an activity, then we will obliged to categorize 
activity according to arbitrary and extraneous 
criteria. This would lead to an uncritical de-
scription of society. 
Although activity forms an underlying re-
ality for all the sciences, it has only been Marx-
ist psychology and Marx’s political economy 
which have explicitly taken up the concept. But 
these two sciences which have emerged from 
common origins are quite foreign to one an-
other at any but the most superficial level. A 
minimal requirement for an interdisciplinary 
concept of activity would be that one and the 
same conception of ‘an activity’ should be con-
sistent with both cultural-historical psychology 
and Marx’s critique of political economy, or at 
least make the relation between the two trans-
parent.  
In forming a ‘unit of analysis’, and in line 
with what Marx had to say on this topic, and 
what is in any case self-evident, activity has to 
be taken together with the real human beings 
active in that activity, and the actual constella-
tion of material culture constituted in that activ-
ity. Amongst other things, this excludes the 
possibility of beginning with hypothetical situa-
tions belonging to a mythological past or im-
puting to nature relations and laws which are to 
be later rediscovered in human activity: it 
means beginning with human beings of the kind 
we find before us today, and whose propensities 
we wish to disclose. 
In the light of a study of the development 
of the idea of ‘unit of analysis’ under various 
names, in Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, 
described by this author elsewhere (Blunden in 
press), the indispensable characteristics of the 
unit of analysis are as follows: 
(1) It is the conception of a singular, in-
divisible thing (not a collection or combination) 
(Hegel 2009 §86), but it is typically a particu-
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lar genus of some universal (such as word 
meaning, commodity relation, private property, 
conditioned reflex). 
If it is a collection or combination, this 
simply means that we have not started at the 
real beginning, having already uncritically ac-
cepted as given, the component concepts and 
relations. As a particular, it may be or not be 
(for example a reflex may be conditioned or 
not, i.e., unconditional) and this particulariza-
tion points to a process of genesis, an inner 
movement and tension.  
(2) It exhibits the essential properties of a 
class of more developed phenomena. 
The point is to discover which thing ex-
hibits the essential properties of a class of phe-
nomena. The discovery of the cell is always the 
outcome of a search for the essential relation 
behind a persistent series of problems. As a 
cell, it is not a typical relation, but rather the 
most primitive of its type, a prototype (Hegel 
2009 §163). The unit of analysis poses the key 
problems which can be examined without pre-
suppositions. 
(3) It is itself an existent phenomenon 
(not a principle or axiom or hypothetical force 
or such like non-observable), in Goethe’s term, 
an Urphänomen (Goethe 1996). 
A science can only base itself on some-
thing real and empirically given. But the exis-
tent thing must be captured as a concept 
because it is the starting point both for a real 
development and for the development of under-
standing. For example, if we understand a 
child’s ‘social situation of development’ simply 
as a collection of factors capable of influencing 
the prospects for a child’s development we 
have nothing more than an excuse to do some 
statistics. On the other hand, when we grasp the 
situation as a predicament, a trap from which 
the child must emancipate herself (Borozhov 
2004), then we have what is both a concept and 
an existent reality. Vygotsky’s (1997: 318) dis-
cussion of Pavlov’s study of salivation in dogs 
confirms that Vygotsky used this same concep-
tion of ‘unit of analysis’.  
The general conception of activity de-
scribed earlier is insufficient as a ‘unit of analy-
sis’. ‘Activity’ is inherently indeterminate, 
because it is everything. A ‘unit of analysis’ on 
the other hand, is determinate, as simple and 
determinate as it is possible to be. ‘Activity’ is 
not a singular thing but a quasi-infinite class of 
things, a substance, the conception of the ulti-
mate reality for a science. As a unit of analysis 
for a science we need some determinate genus 
of activity, an elementary unit of social life. 
In what follows I will review of the ap-
proach of L. S. Vygotsky, A. Meshcheryakov, 
A. N. Leontyev, Yrjö Engeström and Michael 
Cole, writers whose work has been widely cited 
in this tradition, with the aim of making an im-
manent critique, i.e., tracing problems in the 
notion of activity brought out by criticism made 
within this current of thought. 
Vygotsky’s Concept of Activity 
Although Activity Theory is associated 
with the name of Leontyev rather than Vygot-
sky, the concept originated in psychology with 
Vygotsky. The key aspects of Vygotsky’s con-
cept of activity are to be seen in the scenario in 
which a novice (or experimental subject) is try-
ing complete some difficult task, and an adept 
(or researcher) assists the novice complete the 
action by offering them an artifact to use in 
solving the problem. This scenario is repre-
sented in the ‘double stimulation’ experiment 
(Vygotsky 1978). By capturing the psychologi-
cal function of a novice just as it first develops 
in the process of instruction, Vygotsky sheds a 
unique light on the essential nature of human 
psychology. In order to successfully complete a 
task, the subject must use an artifact, and this 
artifact is not simply discovered by the subject, 
but is introduced and demonstrated by the 
other, who acts as a bearer of the culture. The 
novice thus completes the action by means of 
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collaboration with another in the use of an arti-
fact. Similar scenarios appear in other areas of 
Vygotsky’s later work. 
Vygotsky always focused his scientific 
work on interactions between individuals, 
rather than using representations of societal 
phenomena and institutions abstracted from 
their constitution in specific forms of activity, 
but this does not detract from the significance 
of his work for understanding societal activi-
ties. After all, societal institutions exist only in
and through individual actions and interactions 
between individuals.  
In the double-stimulation relationship, 
two people collaborate in one completing a task 
set by an other, using an artifact introduced by 
the other. The artifact is a cultural-historical 
product. In this scenario, all the essential ele-
ments of a notion of activity are encapsulated 
because the artifact may be a product of the 
wider society, and the other carries the knowl-
edge of how to use it. So this is not just a local-
ized relationship between two individuals, but 
is nonetheless a cultural-historical formation.  
Vygotsky (1997b) also introduced the 
idea of a ‘psychological tool’ – an external 
stimulus the use of which introduces a new in-
ternal stimulus into an existing stimulus-
reaction reflex. The psychological tool begins 
as a material object – a word, a symbol, a tool 
or even a body part – which a person learns to 
use in collaboration with another person; the 
external stimulus is gradually transformed into 
an internal stimulus, so that the activity-
structure of the external world of artifacts is 
internalized in the form of the structure of con-
sciousness and the subject becomes able to per-
form the relevant task without the use of an 
external stimulus. 
Vygotsky famously spoke of ‘word-
meaning’ as a ‘unit of analysis’, but this author 
agrees with V. P. Zinchenko (1985) that “one 
can consider tool-mediated action as being very 
close to meaning as unit of analysis” so word-
meaning can be taken as a special case of tool-
mediated collaborative action. 
Some confusion has arisen around the 
claim that Vygotsky defined ‘word meaning’ as 
a unit of analysis of consciousness. Vygotsky’s 
position is put forward unambiguously in the 
first chapter of Vygotsky’s definitive “Thinking 
and Speech” as follows: 
By unit we mean a product of analysis 
which, unlike elements, retains all the basic 
properties of the whole and which cannot be 
further divided without losing them. ... The true 
unit of biological analysis is the living cell, 
possessing the basic properties of the living 
organism. 
What is the unit of verbal thought that 
meets these requirements? We believe that it can 
be found in the internal aspect of the word, in 
word meaning. ... 
... it is in word meaning that thought and 
speech unite into verbal thought. In meaning, 
then, the answers to our questions about the 
relationship between thought and speech can be 
found. (Vygotsky 1997b) 
So Vygotsky saw word meaning as the 
unit for the analysis of the relation between 
thinking and speaking. In the concluding words 
of “Thinking and Speech” he says: 
Thought and language ... are the key to the 
nature of human consciousness. Words play a 
central part not only in the development of 
thought but in the historical growth of 
consciousness as a whole. A word is a 
microcosm of human consciousness. (Vygotsky 
1997b) 
The idea of ‘microcosm’ is a different 
concept again, the idea here being that exhaus-
tively investigating the relation of thought and 
speech, will shed light on all problems of con-
sciousness, because of the centrality of speech 
in human development, but it does not mean 
that word meaning is a unit of analysis for con-
sciousness. Such a claim would be absurd, 
since clearly it is practice, i.e., individual hu-
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man beings, material conditions and activity, 
not words which is the foundation of con-
sciousness. The problem of language is indeed 
key, but far from exhausting the problem of 
consciousness, it is the most developed form of 
behavior. The rest of Vygotsky’s work testifies 
to the fact that the shared use of cultural tools 
of any kind was Vygotsky’s unit of analysis. 
All the essential aspects of the concept of 
activity are present in this concept of Vygot-
sky’s. It has been subject to criticism however. 
Leontyev correctly pointed out that the meaning 
and motives of a person’s action cannot be 
found either within the individual, their use of 
an artifact or their relationship with the collabo-
rator. For this reason, Leontyev made a distinc-
tion between the individual’s action, and the 
social activity of which it is a part and which 
gives it meaning; the goal of action is not the 
same as the motive of the activity of which the 
action is a part.  
The idea is that over history, and the evo-
lution of humankind, action and activity which 
are initially identical, became separated from 
one another. Originally needs were satisfied 
immediately, but with the deferral of satisfac-
tion and the growth of a division of labor there 
developed a labor process, means of production 
and culture generally. This distinction between 
action with its immediate goals, and activity 
with its social motivation, is not touched upon 
by Vygotsky. This is the criticism of Vygotsky 
which laid the basis for what became known as 
Activity Theory. 
Meshcheryakov’s Work  
Alexander Meshcheryakov was a student 
of Vygotsky’s colleague A. R. Luria, and an 
associate of Feliks Mikhailov and Evald 
Ilyenkov. In his development of Vygotsky’s 
concept of activity, he was able to respond i  
practice to criticisms of Vygotsky’s concept. 
Meshcheryakov (2009) developed Vygot-
sky’s conception of learning through collabora-
tion in his work in the education of deaf-blind 
children. A child who is deaf and blind from 
infancy will generally not develop a fully hu-
man consciousness without scientific interven-
tion. This work gave Meshcheryakov’s staff the 
opportunity to bring consciousness into being 
where it did not previously exist. The teacher is 
not just ‘experimenting’ on the child, but assist-
ing the child in achieving something it needs to 
achieve. 
In Meshcheryakov’s scenario, the teacher 
manually helps the novice complete a task us-
ing an artifact taken from the cultural life of 
society, and then gradually withdraws that as-
sistance, in such a way that the novice is able to 
take over the teacher’s actions and complete the 
task autonomously.  
In using a spoon to eat, the child does not 
just satisfy its immediate need for nourishment, 
but by mastering practical-sensuous actions 
with the spoon, forms an internal image which 
contributes to a reconstruction of the whole 
universe of social conventions and practices 
with which the spoon and its shape is associ-
ated. Meshcheryakov takes us through the 
process whereby his students learn, step by 
step, the skills of self-care, play and communi-
cating with others, learn the lay-out of their 
home, their neighbourhood and the activities 
which go on in the various buildings, learn a 
daily timetable, a calendar, the important na-
tional holidays and their meaning, learn to grow 
and prepare food, learn to travel by public 
transport and explore the country and so on and 
so forth; in other words, to reconstruct in their 
own consciousness and activity the entire 
sweep of the culture of their society.  
Meshcheryakov calls the unit of analysis 
‘shared object activity’ (Meshcheryakov 2009: 
294).  
A kind of vicious circle develops: in order 
to know how to act with the tool the child has to 
know it, and in order to know the tool it is 
essential that the child act with it. The vicious 
circle is broken when the adult begins to teach 
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the child to act with the tool in the process of 
satisfying its needs. This instruction is only 
possible in the form of joint object action shared 
between the adult and the child. (Meshcheryakov 
2009) 
Human culture is built into the artifacts a 
person uses and the actions of those with whom 
they are collaborating. Neither Meshcheryakov 
nor Vygotsky, however, went on from these 
ideas of interpersonal collaboration to develop 
an approach to understanding societal phenom-
ena on a broader scale, that is to say, a social 
theory. And this is the problem which Leontyev 
tackled. 
Leontyev’s Anatomy and Taxonomy 
of Activity 
Leontyev never claimed to have identified 
a ‘unit of analysis’ for activity, and always used 
the word “unit” in inverted commas (AA Leon-
tyev 2006), but he did construct an anatomy of 
activity based on the fact that every activity has 
an object (Leontyev 1978). Whatever its limita-
tions, Leontyev’s effort to develop a theory of 
activity made the important advance over Vy-
gotsky’s theory in defining activity as a societal 
entity, beyond the domain of the individual’s 
immediate relations and actions, providing ob-
jective motives for the individual’s actions 
which differed from the subjective goals of the 
individual’s actions. Something of this kind is 
necessary if we are to develop an interdiscipli-
nary concept of activity which ‘connects’ the 
domain of psychology and the domain of the 
social sciences. 
Each activity is defined by its motive, but 
in the sense of an ‘objective’ or social function, 
the attainment of a socially determined object 
and satisfaction of some social need rather than 
a narrowly psychological entity. But such an 
‘objective motive’ is reflected in the conscious-
ness of individuals in such a way as to motivate 
their actions, actions which as mentioned 
above, differ from the activity as a result of the 
development of a social labor process. The ob-
ject thus has a dual existence, being the objec-
tive means of satisfaction of a need, and the 
socially constructed image of it which serves as 
the motivation for a social labor process, which 
may or may not prove adequate to its object and 
which may or may not be present in the con-
sciousness of an individual. An activity for Le-
ontyev is thus a ‘social function’, in this 
subjective/objective sense.  
Activities are realized by individual ac-
tions which are controlled by individuals, each 
oriented towards some goal. An activity is real-
ized by many actions pursuant to different 
goals, but while the goals differ from the mo-
tive of the activity, the activity has no material 
existence separately from the actions through 
which it is realized. A goal, such as “Go to 
point A,” must be kept in the individual’s mind 
if they are to take the appropriate action, but the 
goal does not provide its own inherent motive. 
Further, it is not assumed that the individual has 
an objectively true conception of the motive 
behind the activity to which their action con-
tributes; all that is necessary is that for one rea-
son or another they pursue an appropriate goal, 
and the divers goals pursued by different indi-
viduals objectively add up to furtherance of the 
activity. On the other hand, this understanding 
of an activity and action means that there can 
be no immanent definition of an activity on the 
basis of its constituent goals. The activity can-
not be defined solely in terms of what everyone 
is striving to do. So what constitutes ‘an activ-
ity’ can only be determined either from an ob-
server standpoint, outside of activity, or by 
those who manage society and the various so-
cial functions. This scientific, objectivist aspect 
of Leontyev’s approach is the cost of bridging 
the gulf between psychology and sociology. 
Operations are the means by which ac-
tions are realized according to c nditions, and 
may not be consciously or purposively selected 
or controlled. Actions become ‘internalized’ in 
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being transformed into operations, that is, they 
become ‘second nature’.  
The archetypal activity for Leontyev is a 
collective hunt by a tribal group, in which dif-
ferent individuals cooperate through a tradi-
tional division of labor, pursuing different goals 
(beating or trapping) which contribute to reali-
zation of the social product, which is then dis-
tributed according to social norms and rules, so 
that the needs and expectations of each individ-
ual are met. The actions are carried out using 
socially developed operations which have be-
come ‘second nature’ to the individual, of 
which they are only conscious when something 
‘goes wrong’.  
The concepts of operation and action and 
some concept of activity form an adequate basis 
for a psychology, and it is not my intention to 
criticize the concepts of operation and action. 
The question with which I am concerned here is 
only the adequacy of Leontyev’s notion of ‘an 
activity’, as a connecting link between psychol-
ogy and the phenomena of broader social life. 
The importance of having a critical per-
spective in relation to activity, as a societal en-
tity realized by individual actions, is that it is 
not generally possible to lift an action out of its 
connection with the activity it is realizing and 
which, in a given culture, invest the action with 
social meaning. We will return to this problem 
below when we consider the cross-cultural re-
search of Michael Cole.  
Leontyev’s idea is that in the social field 
there are various activities; each of these activi-
ties is deemed to be meeting some social need, 
performing some function within the commu-
nity’s construction of its needs. There are types 
of activity according to different types of social 
need. Individuals are motivated to participate in 
these activities, but what goals they are moti-
vated to pursue and what motivates them to 
pursue those goals, are open questions. The in-
dividuals’ goals are generated in the social divi-
sion of labor and their ‘objective motives’ 
originate in social life somewhere beyond the 
horizons of their subjective field of action. An 
individual may be motivated by dreams of 
glory to go to war, or motivated by fear of pov-
erty to become an operative and contribute to 
the accumulation of capital. That is all open.  
Over and above the artifact-mediated ac-
tions already highlighted in relation to Vygot-
sky’s treatment, the core of Leontyev’s 
conception of activity is the production and sat-
isfaction of needs. This story is all about needs:  
... we always must deal with specific 
activities, each of which answers a definite need 
of the subject [i.e., the individual], is directed 
toward an object of this need, is extinguished as 
a result of its satisfaction, and is produced again, 
perhaps in other, altogether changed conditions. 
... The main thing that distinguishes one 
activity from another, however, is the difference 
of their objects. It is exactly the object of an 
activity that gives it a determined direction. ... 
The main thing is that behind activity there 
should always be a need, that it should always 
answer one need or another. (Leontyev 1978)  
This conception is dependent on an un-
critical vision of society as a division of labor 
either rationally planned or economically and 
culturally evolved to meet the social needs of 
its citizens. Such conceptions are compatible 
only with the myth of the socialist state or the 
image of a primitive tribal society. It is most 
certainly not compatible with bourgeois society 
or at any rate, with Marx’s vision of bourgeois 
society as set out in Capital and elsewhere. But 
the starting point for a science cannot be some 
other world, whether of the primeval past or the 
utopian future. The starting point for science 
must be, as Marx insisted, the “real activity of 
individuals” which can be “verified in a purely 
empirical way.” 
We will now move to consider Leon-
tyev’s concept of activity in relation to two 
problems of social science for which Marxism 
has developed authoritative models: political 
economy and the constitution of social subjects. 
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Leontyev’s Theory of Activity and 
Marx’s Political Economy 
Marx repeatedly insists that the object of 
all labor subsumed under capital is the expan-
sion of capital, but in Activity Theory, the ob-
ject of an activity is always the meeting of a 
human need, albeit a socially produced collec-
tive need. The idea that the object of the market 
and capital accumulation is the satisfaction of 
human needs is precisely what Marx was argu-
ing against. For example, in Chapter 11 of 
Capital, we read: 
If we consider the process of production 
from the point of view of the simple labor-
process, the worker is related to the means of 
production, not in their quality as capital, but as 
being the mere means and material of his own 
purposeful productive activity... But it is 
different as soon as we view the production 
process as a process of valorization ... the life-
process of capital consists solely in its own 
motion as self-valorizing value (Marx 1996). 
Leontyev’s conception of activity as be-
ing made up of ‘systems of activity’ each an-
swering to a definite need of the citizens 
suggests a theory of history in which social re-
lations evolve somewhat like an ecological sys-
tem. Leontyev’s theory is a kind of 
functionalism. 
Now it could be argued with some merit 
that this characterization of Leontyev’s theory 
is a parody: Leontyev allows that the motives of 
social activities are generated and meaningful 
only socially. But if we allow that in the last 
analysis, the objects of activities are not human 
needs, but some other product of social history, 
then we are no further forward: either the no-
tion of the object of an activity is tautological 
or the notion of a human need is devoid of 
meaning. The supposed ‘object’ of an activity is 
just an ideal reification of that activity. Insofar 
as Leontyev’s concept of an activity is com-
patible with how any social theory constructs 
its objects, it seems that it can add nothing to it. 
In fact, Leontyev’s Activity Theory does not 
seem to find any significant psychological dif-
ference between the Soviet Union, capitalist 
America or Saudi Arabia. 
The unit of the social life of capital is the 
company (Connell 1977), not a functional 
branch of industry. For Marx, capital is a 
‘quasi-subject’. Capital is an activity which sets 
goals and actions for individuals and underlies 
representations people form of the motives of 
their actions, and its units are units of capital, 
companies. But capital cannot be understood as 
answering a definite need of the individual, and 
directed toward an object of this need. Of 
course, capital produces use-values, and the ad-
vocates of the market take that as the beginning 
and end of the matter, but according to Marx 
the object of labor in bourgeois society is the 
production of exchange value and the accumu-
lation of surplus value. The production of use-
values is a means to an end, not the object of 
activity itself. 
The structure of capital, divided into 
companies (in the broad sense), internally struc-
tures activity by means of a flow of funds 
downwards supports a confluent command 
structure, subject to the capital market. All la-
bor subsumed under capital can be divided into 
units and analyzed easily according to the un-
derstanding of capital as a form of activity. 
Human needs are a secondary matter in the dy-
namics of capital. Other organizations modeled 
on capitalist enterprises function internally in 
the same way, and it cannot be presumed that 
the formal aims of the organization (e.g. a pub-
lic service) is the effective object of all actions 
in the organization as every nodal point in the 
distribution of funds creates new (bureaucratic) 
interests. Not only may goals be at odds with 
motives; actions may be at odds with activities! 
Now, even today, the relations of capital 
do not exhaust social life; there are other forms 
of activity that provide different motivations 
other than expansion of capital, but nothing in 
Leontyev’s notion of activity seems to offer an 
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opening for such a distinction, other than the 
conception of capital as a distortion or internal 
contradiction within an otherwise healthy labor 
process. This is not an adequate standpoint. 
Leontyev (2009) talks about the problems 
for his theory arising from the contradiction 
between use value and exchange value, but he 
only goes so far as to point to distortions that 
the market introduces into cultural evolution. 
He points out that a doctor must desire that his 
patients are ill, because it is by curing their ill-
ness that he earns a living. He points out that 
norms of distribution may lead to unfair remu-
neration for some participants in the social la-
bor. He talks about the psychological effect of 
alienation. But he does not see these observa-
tions as calling into question the fundamental 
idea that the object of an activity (including 
wage labor) is the meeting of an objective, so-
cial need. At the strictly psychological level, 
this does not seem to pose a problem: a wage 
laborer indeed pursues a goal useful to the em-
ployer with the idea that her own needs will be 
met as a by-product in distribution of the social 
product by means of wages, and doubtless also 
believes that her work meets a social need, not 
just the profit of the employer.  
That people manage to live despite capi-
talism is not simply because their needs are met 
as a by-product of capital accumulation. Were 
social life to be totally subsumed under capital, 
then not only would the social conditions for 
human life be destroyed but the natural condi-
tions for human life would be extinguished as 
well. But it is surely self-evident that a psy-
chology which is to shed light on the psychol-
ogy of modern capitalist society must recognise 
that this society is a capitalist society, not con-
tingently, but essentially, with a specifically 
capitalist array of character and psychology.  
So as a theory of psychology Leontyev’s 
activity theory still works, just so long as the 
content of ‘activity’ is not taken too seriously. 
But what then does activity theory add to Vy-
gotsky’s original formulation? 
Groups as a Model of Sociality 
On the face of it, the problem of identity 
and the constitution of social subjects, would 
seem amenable to an Activity Theory approach. 
Social subjects are the formal or informal, col-
lective self-conscious actors on the terrain of 
social life, mediating between system-wide 
phenomena and lives of individuals. The forma-
tion of social subjects was a central concern of 
Hegel, and Marx dealt with it in writings such 
as “The 18th Brumaire” and there is a vast 
modern literature on group dynamics, identity 
and other related topics.  
Leontyev’s model of activity theory re-
tains the Kantian conception of the individual 
subject, whilst the activities in which individu-
als participate remain objective functions or 
structures, so the idea of collective subjectivity 
does not fit easily in Leontyev’s theory. A solu-
tion which many writers, both Marxist and non-
Marxist, have adopted is to put in the position 
of the individual subject “an individual or 
group.” That is, the problem of the social char-
acter of human agency is elided by the supposi-
tion that a group may act in the same way as an 
individual, but without considering any addi-
tional problems about how a ‘group’ is consti-
tuted, what is meant by ‘group membership’ or 
how an individual comes to accept the actions 
of a particular group and not another as their 
own.  
For example, Vladimir Lektorsky, who is 
renowned for his work on the subject-object 
relation in the Activity Theory tradition, says: 
Activity cannot exist without a subject. 
But the initial form of a subject is no ego, but a 
subject of collective activity (e.g., a group, a 
community, a team). The individual subjective 
world, individual consciousness, ego are not 
something given (as philosophers in the 17th and 
18th centuries thought), but the result of the 
development and transformations of collective 
activity or practice. (Lektorsky 1999: 107) 
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There is no doubt that social subjects of 
this kind exist and the concept of corporate or 
collective subject has an important role in cul-
tural and historical analysis. However, group 
membership is only one limited mode of sub-
jectivity. Still more limited is ‘membership’ of 
abstract general groups such as race or gender. 
But more importantly, the posing of 
group membership solves nothing in relation to 
the problem of the sociality of individual ac-
tion. In fact, the existence of social groups and 
how they are constituted by individuals is an 
additional problem for Activity Theory over 
and above the objects of activity, as well as the 
problem of how a group acts, when in reality 
actions are only ever executed by individuals. 
Rather than being a solution to the problem of 
membership of society, the idea of membership 
of group simply sets up an infinite regress much 
like the homunculus sets up an infinite regress 
in the other direction. The concept of group 
membership is also a particularly poor repre-
sentation of sociality in relation to modern so-
ciety. Membership of a team or committee is 
one relatively marginal part of social life. 
This ‘lumpy’ conception of subjectivity, 
being either an individual subject or a collective 
subject, far from solving the problem of the so-
cial construction of consciousness, altogether 
misses the point: how is the relation between an 
individual person and institutions like nation, 
market, industry, etc., or group, to be medi-
ated?. For example, in the classic example of a 
hunting group used by Leontyev to explain the 
structure of activity, the question of how the 
group of individuals come to be constituted as a 
group is elided by supposing them to be mem-
bers of a primitive tribal group. How does that 
work for members of modern society who do 
not belong to ‘tribes’?  
How an individual thinks and acts to one 
degree or another as part of a group is a ques-
tion which needs to be answered, not presup-
posed by activity theory. Activity theory can 
and must shed light on identity, interpersonal 
relationships such as solidarity, loyalty, friend-
ship, ethical commitment, respect for law, pur-
suit of science, religious identity, ability to 
cooperate with others, the acquisition of cul-
tural competences and so on. Societies are not 
homogeneous; the relation between the individ-
ual and the people as a whole is one of the most 
essential problems of the human sciences. Born 
into society, and pursuing culturally-historically 
produced ends with culturally-historically pro-
duced means, the individual is participating in 
cultural-historical activity, not as a Kantian ‘in-
dividual subject’, but as a ‘social subject’, 
without any implication of being a ‘member of 
a group’. 
Yrjö Engeström’s ‘root model of 
human activity’ 
Yrjö Engeström tackled a lot of the prob-
lems in Leontyev’s model with his comprehen-
sive schema of nested triangles. Engeström 
starts with the natural model of the activity of 
social creatures, in which an individual’s rela-
tionship to their environment is mediated by 
their community. This makes in fact a three-
way relationship of mutual mediation, as the 
community’s relationship with its environment 
is mediated by individuals and the individuals’ 
relationship with their community is mediated 
by the environment.  
The specifically human form of life then 
develops through the mediation of each of these 
three relationships:  
• The individuals’ relationship with their en-
vironment opens up as the direct relation-
ship with nature is mediated by emergent 
tool use and tool making underlying a sys-
tem of production mediating between needs 
and their satisfaction.  
• The relationship of the entire community to 
the means satisfying its needs opens up with 
the direct relationship being replaced by a 
division of labor with a system of distribu-
tion of the products of labor.  
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• The direct relationship of the individual to 
the group gives way to the emergence of 
larger and more complex communities and 
social relationships mediated by norms, 
rules and traditions, including the exchange 
of products on the market.  
The combination of production, distribu-
tion and exchange are then mediated by a sys-
tem of social consumption of the products of 
labor. Thus, we have Engeström’s (1987) fa-
mous expanding triangle of triangles. The rela-
tionship between the (Kantian, individual) 
subject and its object (the means of satisfying 
the subject’s needs) is now subject to multiple 
lines of mediation. Each implementation of this 
schema produces an outcome which is a 
changed relationship of all the factors, and each 
of the mediating links contains contradictions, 
the mediation of which generate further lines of 
development. 
In the editorial introduction to “Perspec-
tives on Activity Theory” (1999) of which 
Engeström is co-author, he says that a ‘strong 
candidate’ for a unit of analysis of Activity 
Theory is “object-oriented, collective and cul-
turally mediated human activity, or activity sys-
tem.” This definition is a fair representation of 
the state of Activity Theory up till now. 
In his classic work (1987), Engeström 
traced conceptions of the ‘unit of analysis’ used 
by a series of writers in the Russian CHAT tra-
dition, and went on to specify four criteria for 
what he calls a “viable root model of human 
activity”:  
First, activity must be pictured in its 
simplest, genetically original structural form, as 
the smallest unit that still preserves the essential 
unity and quality behind any complex activity. 
Second, activity must be analyzable in its 
dynamics and transformations, in its evolution 
and historical change. No static or eternal 
models will do. Third, activity must be 
analyzable as a contextual or ecological 
phenomenon. The models will have to 
concentrate on systemic relations between the 
individual and the outside world. Fourth, 
specifically human activity must be analyzable 
as culturally mediated phenomenon. No dyadic 
organism-environment models will suffice 
(1987). 
The first of the above criteria clearly indi-
cates that Engeström is talking about a ‘unit of 
analysis’, though he never actually makes this 
claim, and indeed denies it. Nonetheless, the 
way the concept is deployed, it takes the place 
of a unit of analysis. It cannot be a unit of 
analysis however. Altogether, Engeström’s 
model represents relationships between indi-
vidual (subject), object, outcome, community, 
environment, social rules, instruments of pro-
duction, division of labor, production, distribu-
tion, exchange and consumption. Engeström 
calls this the ‘root model’ for activity theory on 
the basis of the above criteria.  
Even if we assume that production, dis-
tribution, exchange and consumption are d -
rivative rather than essential concepts, and we 
take ‘outcome’ as a reproduction of the object, 
we are still left with seven distinct concepts – 
subject, object, community, environment, social 
rules, instruments of production and division of 
labor – which have to be derived before we 
have any ‘unit of analysis’. But if the ultimate 
reality we are dealing with is activity, then 
every one of these concepts is derivative of the 
concept of activity. For example, ‘subject’ is 
one of the seven concepts which are pr sup-
posed in the conception of activity; but what is 
the nature of the subject? And how is a ‘com-
munity’ constituted if not by activity? Answers 
to these questions should be outcomes of a the-
ory of activity, and cannot be its presupposi-
tions.  
The idea of pairs or triplets of concepts 
which are mutually constitutive, being a differ-
entiated unity, has a long pedigree, but a set of 
seven mutually constitutive concepts is not 
really tenable, and Engeström surely doesn’t 
mean it that way.  
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Engeström’s claim rests on the idea of the 
initial natural relationship of individual-
community-environment ‘expanding’ through 
the intervention of mediating elements. This 
would make activity the coincidence of three 
processes: tool-making, law-making and labor 
organization. So activity is derivative from 
these concepts. It is a plausible conception, 
similar to Hegel’s schema of the differentiation 
of production and consumption mediated by 
labor, and used to theorise the emergence of 
Spirit in his 1802-03 system, but it is entirely 
speculative. It has no empirical content. The 
only unity tying the set of concepts together as 
whole is the thesis that at some time in the past 
things happened this way. Such a speculation 
cannot be the premise for a science or its start-
ing point. 
To make a start with a science we have to 
have a concept of what it is that we are investi-
gating and the possibility of observing it. But 
here at the very least we have seven entities, 
whose conceptions are posited as preliminary to 
the science of activity. The argument seems to 
be a proof that one cannot have a unit of analy-
sis for Activity Theory, inasmuch as the root 
model which is “the smallest unit that still pre-
serves the essential unity and quality behind 
any complex activity” is already a composite. 
Whether it is called a ‘root model’ or a 
‘unit of analysis’, Engeström’s ‘expanding tri-
angle’ is an impressive schema of social life, 
but it is not the foundation of a science, in the 
sense that Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky 
envisaged. Engeström has given us an elegant 
general schema for various components of so-
cial life, but he has not given us a conception of 
any of those components or of activity itself. 
Michael Cole and cultural context 
Michael Cole agrees that the unit of 
analysis for Activity Theory is ‘joint artifact-
mediated activity’ but he points to some impor-
tant nuances in what constitutes ‘an activity’ 
and the relation of actions and artifacts to the 
activity in which they are subsumed. 
Firstly, Cole showed (in press) that activi-
ties cannot be ‘modeled’ by action systems 
lifted out of the cultural contexts to which they 
are indigenous and dropped into another cul-
tural context. Cross cultural researchers had 
underestimated, according to Cole’s findings, 
the extent to which the presuppositions of stan-
dard interviewing and test procedures are im-
plicit in the use of certain types of artifact, 
styles of speech and so on. This meant for ex-
ample, that standard psychological tests used as 
part of scientific activity, would fail when im-
plemented with people belonging to a different 
culture to which the practice of scientific re-
search is foreign. For example, people who 
were quite unfamiliar with being asked ques-
tions, the answers to which were obvious and 
already known to the questioner, solely in order 
to test their intelligence or whatever, would re-
spond to such questions in ways that bore no 
relation to the test design. The ways in which 
questions were construed by the subjects on one 
hand, and by the experimenters, on the other 
hand, were quite different. 
Secondly, Cole found (1997) that psycho-
logical work with experimental subjects could 
only succeed to the extent that both the re-
searcher and the experimental subject shared a 
common aim (even if they had different mo-
tives). This could happen if an adult subject 
was part of a culture where scientific experi-
mentation was widely understood and sup-
ported, but in many cases it could only be 
achieved by the researcher focusing on achiev-
ing something that the experimental subject 
wanted to achieve, in the hope that scientific 
insights would come as a by-product of the sub-
ject doing what she wanted to do anyway. For 
example, in order to effectively study a learning 
process, it was necessary to actually help some-
one learn something they really wanted to learn. 
Generally speaking the actions and arti-
facts used in the scenario have to be indigenous 
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to the culture of the experimental subject and 
the scenario must be either itself a normal part 
of the subject’s culture, or so constructed that 
the way in which it is construed within the sub-
ject culture is transparent.  
Under these conditions it is possible for 
the two parties to share a common ‘project’. 
Otherwise ambiguity, misunderstanding and 
failures of communication prevail. Where sub-
jects are not committed to a common project, 
one and the same action or artifact, for example 
an interview question, could figure in two dif-
ferent activities. This is the relevance of the 
‘hermeneutic circle’: each action is interpreted 
by a subject on the basis of a presumption of 
the activity or project of which it is a part, but a 
project can only be perceived through the ac-
tions by which it is instantiated. This is how 
cross-cultural misunderstandings occur. 
Much of Cole’s research went to the fact 
that meaning is context-dependent, but if we 
were to rest at this point, then the possibility of 
a unit of analysis is ruled out, for ‘context’ is an
open ended totality: where do you draw the 
boundary around what is relevant to context? 
But Cole’s research went beyond the impossi-
bility of meaning being retained in the transfer 
from one cultural context to another. Under ap-
propriate conditions, an experimenter could 
carry out a test with a subject of a different cul-
ture, provided that the actions of both parties 
belong to a common project.  
Projects 
Like ‘object’, ‘project’ represents the 
teleological aspect of social life, people striving 
for something. Project is broader than object, 
because it includes both the end and the means, 
the norms through which an object is pursued 
within a given culture, over some period of 
time, with shared expectations about the mean-
ing of the actions used. The means and ends are 
not distinct components of the project because, 
as Hegel (2009) demonstrated, means and ends 
mutually constitute one another and are ulti-
mately identical.  
‘Project’ differs from ‘joint mediated ac-
tivity’ because it is a unit and not a substance; a 
project is ‘an activity’, a ‘unit’ of activity: pur-
suing shared aims according to certain common 
norms, over some period of time. Participation 
in joint mediated activity cannot be made sense 
of until we understand what project each par-
ticipant construes the actions to be a part of, 
and how, if the different subjects are pursuing 
different projects, their respective projects re-
late to one another.  
A project mediates collaborative activity, 
but it is not an artifact. All activity is artifact-
mediated, but people can cooperate in a project 
by pursuing the common aim even if they are 
not in direct communication. The use of arti-
facts remains a part of collaborative projects, 
but the key mediator is the project itself, how-
ever it is represented. Cultural differences such 
as language affect collaboration in a project, but 
what is fundamental is not cultural difference or 
commonality, but the project’s common aims 
and norms. 
Cole’s work demonstrated that the speci-
ficity of an activity, its distinctness, as for ex-
ample, being indigenous to a certain national 
culture, penetrates every aspect of a person’s 
motivation, relationship to other people and un-
derstanding of actions and artifacts used in a 
scenario. Within a given culture, actions and 
artifacts are construed in a particular way ac-
cording to the project that they are taken to be a 
part of. These findings bring us to the concep-
tion of a unit of analysis for activity that we are 
looking for. 
Towards a Unit of Analysis for an 
Interdisciplinary Activity Theory 
Societal phenomena, such as states, mar-
kets, social mores and institutions, which exist 
beyond the bounds of the immediate interac-
tions amongst a group of individuals, neverthe-
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less exist only in and through the actions and 
experiences of individuals and the artifacts that 
they use, carrying with them shared or overlap-
ping meanings. A hermeneutic circle operates 
in constituting both the societal phenomena and 
the consciousness of participating individuals 
which extends beyond the bounds one-on-one 
interaction. The problem cannot be resolved by 
naturalizing societal phenomena so that they 
can be taken out of the hermeneutic circle and 
treated as givens. 
In the foregoing review of efforts to form 
a conception of activity, it seems that attempts 
to incorporate ‘supra-individual’ aspects of so-
ciety such as social division of labor, norms and 
rules, systems of production and distribution, 
and so on, fail to provide the basis for a unit of 
analysis. The fact is that these societal phenom-
ena exist for the individual only through (1) the 
use of artifacts which originate and carry cul-
turally determined meaning from outside the 
immediate setting of their use, and (2) the regu-
larity of expectations and experiences of inter-
action with other individuals. Consequently, a 
unit of analysis for the study of activity must be 
based on ideas like that of Vygotsky and 
Meshcheryakov cited earlier, which take the 
collaborative actions of two individuals, with 
one using an artifact introduced by the other, as 
the basis for understanding activity. Such col-
laborative actions are always part of a common 
project shared by the collaborating individuals. 
Notions of social norms, division of labor, mar-
kets, and so on, must therefore be derived from 
their foundation in the artifact-mediated col-
laboration of individuals in common projects or 
‘project collaboration’.  
To be clear, ‘project collaboration’ is not 
something different from activity, but simply a 
unit of activity, a unit of joint mediated activity. 
Social life is a tangle of interactions, both for-
mal and informal, between individuals, both 
friends and strangers; what is being suggested 
is that ‘projects’ are the threads from which the 
fabric of social life is woven and may be ana-
lytically unstitched. 
The scenarios we have considered have 
been limited to pair-wise collaboration, but the 
presence of an artifact is always implicitly the 
presence of a third or more parties to the col-
laboration, so it seems that the essentials of 
multi-sided collaboration (as in group dynam-
ics) are contained in two-sided collaboration so 
long as it remains the case that the artifact me-
diating the interaction between the two parties 
comes from outside. Collaboration always im-
plies that the individuals involved share not 
only a common object but a common project. 
According to the OED, a project is “a planned 
or proposed undertaking; a scheme, a proposal; 
a purpose, an objective. In business, science, 
etc., a collaborative enterprise, frequently in-
volving research or design, that is carefully 
planned to achieve a particular aim” (OED 
2008).  
‘A project’ differs from ‘an activity’ un-
derstood à la Leontyev, as a system of actions 
directed towards a given socially defined object 
in several respects. Firstly, a project includes 
the individuals and all the artifacts and norms 
and rules indigenous to that project. A project is 
always directed towards some ideal. Projects 
need to be understood as historically articu-
lated, and individual projects carry forward pro-
jects that may have a long history. In this sense 
the idea of project is subject-centered rather 
than object-centered. In “Theses on Feuer-
bach,” Marx criticised “hitherto-existing mate-
rialism” for failing to conceive of practice “as 
human sensuous activity, ... subjectively.” It is 
not at all the case that in developing “the active 
side” an objective, materialistic standpoint is 
compromised. Human practice is active; activ-
ity is not just passive attraction to an object, but 
active projection and pursuit of ideals.  
In recent Hegel interpretation (Pinkard 
1994) the word ‘project’ has been used as an 
interpretation of what Hegel called a ‘formation 
of consciousness’, that is, a self-conscious his-
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torical form of social practice. ‘Project’ carries 
the connotation of being extended in time be-
yond the actions of current participants and 
through historical time, and of being an on-
going bearer of meaning, identity, values and 
ethical convictions.  
Relations between collaborators in a pro-
ject are not necessarily symmetrical or egalitar-
ian, but a shared commitment to the project is 
integral to the concept and the project itself is 
part of the relationship. Projects harbor a host 
of different kinds of relationship and interac-
tion. 
Collaboration 
Projects include conflict as well as coop-
eration; collaboration implies that the partici-
pants argue over what should be done and how. 
That is, the relationship in which one person 
endeavours to prevent the other from doing 
something is just as essential as the situation in 
which both strive for the same outcome by the 
same means. Simple cooperation, in which con-
flict is avoided, perhaps by means of a division 
of labor or the adherence to rigid norms and 
rules of behavior, fails to capture the nature of 
the collaboration. A conflict always has a 
shared situation as its outcome, which is indica-
tive of a notion of its irreducible co-production; 
were it not the case that both parties will have 
to share the outcome, there would be no basis 
for conflict. The outcome is always the resul-
tant of at least two independent wills, and con-
tains moments of both conflict and cooperation. 
In general, we can see cooperation (pursuing 
the same end using some division of labor, 
whether natural or artificial) and conflict (pur-
suit of mutually exclusive states of affairs) are 
special, limiting cases of collaboration.  
Other important limiting cases of collabo-
ration, are those relating to ‘ownership’ of the 
project: solidarity is where one subject volun-
tarily subordinates themself to the other’s ends; 
‘cooption’ is where one subject subsumes an-
other under their own project. Other limiting 
cases hinge on attribution, for example, a jew-
eler has a technician make ring to their design, 
but is attributed as the maker. 
Collaboration is an important way of con-
ceiving of social bonds, because the project 
provides the mediation between subjects shar-
ing a social bond, which are consolidated 
through the shared artifacts and actions used on 
a continuing basis to pursue the project. Self-
evidently, collaboration provides an approach 
to the understanding of social subjects from a 
participant point of view. Shared artifacts and 
interacting actions is an important condition for 
the formation of social bonds, but without the 
existence of shared projects amongst a group of 
individuals, social bonds cannot develop. Col-
laboration also offers an important way of ap-
proaching the ethical analysis of social 
relations. 
Ethics and Collaboration 
Invariably any scientific project carries 
within it a commitment to certain ethical norms 
and concepts. Liberal economic theory bases 
itself on a conception of individual, rational 
agents which also forms the foundation of lib-
eral ethics, for example, and discourse analysis 
must presume that participants ought to per-
suade one another with rational argument, even 
while knowing they don’t. A human science 
which does not make its ethical commitments 
explicit is only deceiving itself. 
The notion of collaboration not only pro-
vides a starting point for science, but is also 
normative, in the sense that when subjects work 
together, then they ought to share control over 
the project and share in its rewards, and in gen-
eral they expect to, even if they don’t. Collabo-
ration thus provides a reference point for ethics. 
For example, if a group of people work together 
to complete a difficult journey, then each will 
expect to have a say on the chosen route and 
bear an equal share of privations, and so on. 
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Different relationships may apply (e.g. a guide 
leads a group of tourists, or a military com-
mander assumes leadership) but in such cases 
where different ethical norms apply, the actions 
are quite different in their psychological impli-
cations. The psychology of collaboration does 
not arise directly from the activity itself, but is 
refracted through the relevant ethical norms. 
As we have already noted, individuals 
participate in project collaboration in a number 
of quite distinct ways; they may strive to 
achieve the project or they may strive to frus-
trate or modify the project, and there is nothing 
inherently unethical in conflict; in fact conflict 
is a normal part of collaboration on projects; 
shared projects are impossible without conflict 
and conflict is meaningless outside of shared 
projects.  
While individuals may participate in a 
project in order to further its ideals and prac-
tices, they may alternatively, participate in the 
project with only the aim of receiving side-
benefits which are external to the project, rather 
than those inherent in the project itself. This is a
distinction which Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) 
makes, as for example, when sports stars play 
only for the high monetary rewards rather than 
to further the practice of the sport in its own 
right. For example, the psychology of art 
changes dramatically when an artist ceases to 
pursue the aim of furthering art and begins to 
produce for the market. It is impossible to sepa-
rate the psychology from the ethical norms. The 
same goes for wage-labor. Individuals may 
make decisions collectively, or either party may 
take a leading role in defining the project, or 
one may simply follow the lead of the other, or 
even participate solely in solidarity with the 
other. The psychology of participating in some 
project is significantly affected by the extent to 
which a person participates in the planning and 
direction of the project. There are normative 
questions in all these modifications of the para-
digmatic collaborative relationships, each of 
which also have significant psychological im-
plications. 
The idea of collaboration is already im-
portant in social service industries. Doctors and 
patients collaborate in restoring the patient’s 
well-being, and health service workers know 
that the psychology and well-being of a patient 
are dramatically affected by their equal partici-
pation in their own treatment. The classical 
therapeutic relationship corresponds to quite 
different psychology, because in such a case the 
project of achieving the patient’s well-being is 
exclusively that of the therapist. 
Every instance of collaboration in a pro-
ject has characteristic problems – the doctor 
may regard herself as expert and fail to share 
decision-making with the patient, the architect 
may see the building as a monument to their art 
rather than a home for the owner, and so on. All 
these issues are psychological in their impact 
because they are also normative. 
Vera John Steiner made an extensive 
study of well-known artistic and scientific col-
laborations, and proposed a 4-way typology as 
follows: 
1. Distributed collaboration, which 
“takes place in casual settings and also in more 
organized contexts. These include conversa-
tions at conferences, in electronic discourse 
communities, and among artists who share a 
studio space. In these groups, participants ex-
change information and explore thoughts and 
opinions. Their roles are informal and volun-
tary.” 
2. Complementarity collaboration: “char-
acterized by a division of labor based on com-
plementary expertise, disciplinary knowledge, 
roles, and temperament. Participants negotiate 
their goals and strive for a common vision.” 
3. Family collaboration: “a mode of in-
teraction in which roles are flexible or may 
change over time” (John Steiner 2000). 
There is in fact a whole literature on col-
laboration, especially collaborative learning in 
which CHAT already plays a central role, as 
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well as studies of work methods, group dynam-
ics, sports psychology and so on, where Activ-
ity Theory is immediately applicable even 
without the problems raised by the issue of an 
interdisciplinary concept of activity. This is not 
new: what is proposed is that this rich field of 
work on collaboration can be extended to theo-
rise societal phenomena. 
It may be noted as an aside here that Ac-
tivity Theory has hitherto taken division of la-
bor as the norm of cooperation. Leontyev’s 
scenario of the primitive hunting group with a 
division of labor between the beater and the 
trapper is prototypical. But the whole idea of 
the motives of actions diverging from the goals 
of actions rests on the idea of elaboration of a 
division of labor as the process constitutive of 
the human condition. But if division of labor is 
built into the foundations, then for example, the 
possibility of taking a critical attitude towards a 
hierarchy of expertise in therapeutic work is 
excluded, let alone the neo-liberal conception 
of learning as a customer-service provider rela-
tionship between student and teacher, or other 
neo-liberal conceptions of the same kind. Divi-
sion of labor is a special, limiting case of col-
laboration, but the reverse is not true. The 
hypothetical historical narrative in which divi-
sion of labor is elaborated by the introduction 
of difference into a formerly homogeneous, 
presumably infinite community, does not stand 
scrutiny. Division of labor can just as well be 
seen to have arisen by formerly remote com-
munities establishing trading relationships with 
one another, as an outcome of collaboration. 
Collaboration is well-established as a 
paradigm in the creative arts and in the sci-
ences, where cross-media, cross-disciplinary 
and cross-sectoral collaboration is regarded of 
particular creative value. The ethics of collabo-
ration is in distinct contrast to liberalism, which 
emphasises the concept of the individual as an 
autonomous agent and the archetypal relation-
ship between agents is contract or exchange, 
rather than collaboration. These are forms of 
cooperation which are external rather than in-
ternal to subjectivity. 
The point of these quite cursory remarks 
is to draw attention to the richness of the con-
cept of ‘project collaboration’. It is the fact tha 
collaboration has a normative core for human 
beings that makes it so rich as a foundation for 
human science; and it is the fact that collabora-
tion lies at the foundation of formation of the 
human form, phylogenetically, culturally and 
ontogenetically, that makes collaboration such a 
powerful notion for ethics.  
In fact, from the standpoint of collabora-
tion, the formation of collective subjects – na-
tions, churches, social movements, companies, 
etc., etc. – is almost self-evident, as collective 
subjects are collaborative projects. 
Marx’s Critique of Political 
Economy and Activity Theory 
It is now possible to establish the rela-
tionship between activity theory and Marx’s 
critique of political economy. Whereas project 
collaboration is the prototypical, genuinely hu-
man relationship, capital springs from the rela-
tionship of exchange of labor. It is especially 
clear in Marx’s very early work, “Comment on 
James Mill,” (1975) that Marx saw the relation-
ship of exchange of the products of labor as an 
essentially manipulative and corrupting rela-
tionship. This relationship has nonetheless 
come to be the dominant relationship in bour-
geois society. Capital rests on a quite particular 
(de)formation of the relationship of project col-
laboration, in which each subject pursues their 
own end, but regards the other’s labor instru-
mentally, simply as a means to their own end, 
and pursues their project by means of exchange 
of equivalents. Nevertheless: “the notion of 
human equality [can acquire] the fixity of a 
popular prejudice ... only in a society in which 
the great mass of the produce of labor takes the 
form of commodities” [Capital Chapter 1] 
(Marx 1996). 
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The commodity relation leads to an b-
stract general logic in which the projects pur-
sued by different subjects relate to each other 
only externally or quantitatively, rather than a 
concrete universal logic, which characterizes 
project collaboration. The division of labor 
which results from the subsumption of collabo-
rative projects under capital, puts abstract gen-
eral relationships in the dominant position, and 
these abstract general relationships penetrate 
deeper and deeper into consciousness, with the 
results being concentration of capital and frag-
mentation of social bonds, as Marx demon-
strated in Capital and other works, such as The 
Communist Manifesto. 
So in this view, Activity Theory and 
Marx’s critique of political economy have 
compatible conceptions of social life and meth-
odological principles. But what of the conclu-
sions to be drawn about the nature of social 
life? Marx’s critique of political economy 
points to the outcome of the growth of a spe-
cific kind of activity, namely production for 
exchange, leading to a labor process more and 
more, though never completely subsumed under 
capital. 
The normal situation today is that col-
laboration is subsumed under the market, where 
workers collaborate inside capitalist enterprises. 
Recently, neoliberal restructuring of corpora-
tions has increasingly introduced market rela-
tions inside companies. On the other hand, in 
the ‘third sector’, exchange is subsumed under 
collaboration, when some participants earn a 
living and others contribute monetarily while 
contributing to a collaborative project. In any 
real situation, both types of relationship are pre-
sent and contribute to the psychology of the 
participants. Although project collaboration is 
the norm of social life amongst human beings, 
modern capitalism is seeing an expansion of the 
market and its penetration of more and more 
spheres of activity. Nonetheless, exchange of 
commodities remains a special, limiting case of 
project collaboration.  
There is also a third mode of cooperation, 
hierarchy. In this mode of cooperation, labor 
takes place within some kind of hierarchy. This 
may be the command structure within an or-
ganization, or a traditionally established hierar-
chy in which people act according to their 
station in life, in relations of traditional depend-
ence. Alternatively, it may be bureaucratic or 
meritocratic hierarchy, such as the hierarchy of 
expertise that develops spontaneously even 
within voluntary groups, in therapeutic relation-
ships or for example the relation between 
teacher and pupils.  
That is, there are three broad types of co-
operation: hierarchy, exchange and collabora-
tion. From the standpoint of project 
collaboration being a unit of analysis for activ-
ity theory, hierarchical command and cus-
tomer/service provider relations are understood 
as limit cases of collaboration. Each of these 
modes of cooperation carries with it normative 
as well as descriptive weight. In this view, the 
relations of capital constitute one of several 
domains of modern social life; labor not sub-
sumed under capital may be organized along 
traditional lines (such as domestic labor within 
the family) or may be collaborative (such as in 
voluntary organizations). It is important to es-
tablish what is psychologically and sociologi-
cally specific about the relations of capital in 
modern society. Political conditions in the So-
viet Union made these kinds of distinction im-
possible. Relations of domination and 
exploitation which arose from the market out-
side the USSR could be subject to criticism, but 
relations of domination which arose from non-
economic causes such as bureaucracy or gender 
were undertheorized. 
We shall now return to the question raised 
earlier of a taxonomy of activity. 
Towards a Taxonomy of Activity 
At first we see that project collaboration 
constitutes the basic unit, the molecule of social 
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life, presenting us a picture of millions and mil-
lions of transitory relations of conflict and co-
operation between people sharing certain ends, 
in a certain division of power enjoying internal 
and externals benefits, and using certain arti-
facts and types of action to mediate their col-
laborative activity. Such projects appear and 
disappear, and are reproduced in new forms at 
different times and places, are nested one 
within another, whilst every person is engaged 
in a multiplicity of such relationships at any 
given time. How ought we to move from this 
complex picture of apparently chaotic activity? 
How can this microscopic unit of analysis for 
activity underpin a view of social life as a 
whole?  
Categorization of the different types of 
activity and their scope has to be derived from 
the notion of project collaboration itself, its 
normative core and the differences which can 
be unfolded out of that core, as anticipated 
above. We have already seen that the distinc-
tions between collaboration, hierarchical com-
mand and the market flow from the notion of 
project collaboration. Within capital, different 
companies constitute units of capital as indi-
cated by the management structure erected on 
the basis of ownership of capital. Hierarchical 
and collaborative relations arise from tradition, 
legislation, custom and so on and are norma-
tively transparent in their structure according to 
the structure of organizations, states, families 
and so on, although subject to many kinds of 
distortion. Aside from the taxonomy that flows 
from different forms of the collaborative rela-
tionship, further distinctions follow from the 
articulation of projects over various periods of 
time from momentary to historical. Social 
movements, nations, religious communities all 
constitute themselves as projects. The pursuit of 
an art or profession, is also constituted as a pro-
ject, with practitioners striving to perfect the 
art, each generation standing on the shoulders 
of the generation before. 
An finer grain of analysis of social life is 
given by concepts, realized in and through ac-
tivity. In general concepts represent the sedi-
mentation of past projects which have become 
objectified within the culture. When concepts 
first appear, they constitute projects, but in 
time, they become objectified and merge into 
the fabric of social life, the language and cul-
ture generally. Once a concept has become ob-
jectified, it ceases to have an independent life, 
but participates as an aspect of all subsequent 
projects. Some concepts however, not yet ob-
jectified, retain vitality, and constitute living, 
self-conscious projects.  
Consciousness is therefore constituted by 
participation in a multiplicity of different pro-
jects and activity organized around a multiplic-
ity of different more or less independent 
concepts, which represent the sediment of past 
projects. “The tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like an nightmare on the brains of the 
living” (Marx 1979). 
Conclusion 
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory may 
fulfil its potential as a contributor to a general 
cultural and historical science, by studying the 
psychology of collaboration, laying a founda-
tion from which the various societal phenomena 
can be rendered in terms of the same unit of 
analysis: project collaboration. Just as the atom 
is the system for particle physics, but unit for 
molecular physics; project collaboration is the 
system for psychology, but the unit for social 
science. It is the point where a ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ operates in the mutual constitution of 
social life and psychology. 
Because the notion of project collabora-
tion has both normative and descriptive force, 
there is an internal tension within the concept 
which is well suited to the study of individual 
and social development. 
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